Economic growth and the environment: What can we learn from household data? by Talikoff, Alexander Strickland Pfaff & Chaudhuri, Shubham
 Columbia University 
 
Department of Economics 














Economic Growth and the Environment: 


















Department of Economics 
Columbia University 
New York, NY 10027 
April 2002 
 
Economic growth and the environment:
what can we learn from household data?∗
Shubham Chaudhuri and Alexander S.P. Pfaﬀ
Department of Economics
and




The fuel-use decisions of households in developing economies, because they
directly influence the level of indoor air quality that these households enjoy
(with its attendant health eﬀects), provide a natural arena for empirically as-
sessing latent preferences towards the environment and how these evolve with
increases in income. Such an assessment is critical for a better understanding
of the likely eﬀects of aggregate economic growth on the environment. Using
household data from Pakistan we estimate Engel curves for traditional (dirty)
and modern (clean) fuels. Our results provide empirical support for the house-
hold choice framework developed in Pfaﬀ, Chaudhuri and Nye (2002a), which
suggests that even if environmental quality is a normal good, non-monotonic
environmental Engel curves can arise. Under plausible assumptions about the
emissions implied by fuel use, our estimates yield an inverted-U relationship
between indoor air pollution and income, mirroring the environmental Kuznets
curves that have been documented using aggregate data. We then demon-
strate, through a simple voting model, that this household-choice framework
can generate aggregate EKCs even in a multi-agent setting with heterogeneous
households and purely external environmental eﬀects.
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1. Introduction
Cross-country empirical analysis by Grossman and Krueger (1995), and others,
brought to the fore the possibility of non-monotonic relationships between income
and environmental quality.1 Initial economic growth degrades environment, but
continued growth could reverse initial adverse eﬀects. Not surprisingly, these ‘Envi-
ronmental Kuznets Curves’ (or EKCs) have generated considerable debate. Others
have questioned the robustness of these initial, aggregate findings, arguing that the
relationship between environment and economic growth is sensitive to the pollu-
tants studied and the data used.2 Many have also noted the range of potentially
confounding eﬀects not incorporated in these analyses. For instance, if environmen-
tal outcomes for other, linked regions such as trading partners are not taken into
account, interpretations based on results for one location can be misleading.3
From a policy perspective, it is important to establish the validity and generality
of these aggregate empirical findings. It is also crucial to obtain a better understand-
ing of the channels through which the claimed eﬀect might arise, as well as the role
that policies can play in amplifying or in dampening this eﬀect. This paper con-
tributes to the latter, briefly illustrating a household-choice mechanism (relevant for
private degradation4 and for voting on the environmental regulations many consider
a key to EKCs), and most importantly providing estimates of EKC-relevant income
eﬀects based on household-level choices that determine environmental quality.
To see the value of household-level analysis, consider that the models often used
to demonstrate EKC results are planner models. In contrast to ours, these suggest
neither new empirical paths nor explicit stories for how environmental regulations
in fact arise. Certainly the neoclassical growth tradition has provided one way of
thinking about how EKCs might arise.5 Gruver 1976, for example, incorporates
the choice of investment between productive and pollution-control capital. Under
certain parameter configurations, the optimal growth path can feature accumula-
tion of productive capital, in the initial stages of growth, until beyond a target
stock of productive capital savings are shifted to pollution control.6 Such mod-
els can be linked only to aggregate-level empirics of the sort now prevalent in the
literature, however. Further, the dynamic representative agent framework lacks a
realistic political-economic mechanism through which degradation might in reality
be reversed, and will not easily explain regulatory choice given heterogeneous voters.
1See World Bank 1992, Selden & Song 1994, Shafik 1994 and Holtz-Eakin & Selden 1995.
2Special issues of Environment and Development Economics November 1997 and Ecological
Economics May 1998, and Millimet & Stengos 1999, Harbaugh et al. 2000, Taskin & Zaim 2000.
3See, e.g., Saint-Paul 1995. Pfaﬀ 2001 discusses New England forests, which fell significantly
with economic growth and then returned. That agriculture shifted to the Midwest, timber shifted
to the Lake States and Northwest, and both were then exported to New England seems crucial.
4Many forms of degradation of the environment feature components that are private, and we
observe significant private provision of environmental abatement in the absence of regulations.
5Others have shown that changes in the composition of goods consumed and techniques of
production can matter (Copeland and Taylor 1995, Jaeger 1998, Grossman 1995.) Still others
have focused on single-actor stories about preferences and abatement technologies, which to yield
EKC predictions require explicit aggregation through identified mechanisms.(Andreoni and Levin-
son 2001; Pfaﬀ, Chaudhuri and Nye 2002b, which explicitly models a voting mechanism).
6See, for instance, John & Pecchenino 1994, Selden & Song 1995, Stokey 1998, Chimeli 2001,
and for related work also Plourde 1972, Keeler et al. 1972, D’Arge & Kogiku 1973, Forster 1973,
Gruver 1976, Stevens 1976, Asako 1980, Becker 1982 and Tahvonen & Kuuluvainen 1993.
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The point of departure for this paper, then, is our claim that whatever the EKC
mechanism at work, it ultimately has to be linked back to a theoretically coherent
and empirically grounded account of: i) how households’ marginal valuations of the
environment evolve with increases in household income; and ii) how those views get
aggregated up and manifested through the political policy-making process and/or
through markets. On these two questions, there has been surprisingly little research.
The diﬃculty with addressing the first question eﬀectively empirically is that
when households’ environmental impacts eﬀects are external, observed household
choices will not reflect those impacts. A household might value cleaner air but not
curb its pollution, no matter its income, given that this pollution has a vanishingly
small impact on the air quality the household enjoys. This makes it diﬃcult to
estimate the eﬀect of income on household demand for environmental quality.
Our empirical innovation, given this diﬃculty, is to focus upon indoor air quality
in developing countries, and fuels choices. These choices can be expected to reflect
pollution impacts because the indoor air quality degraded by fuels usage is a private
good. While smoke does exit the household, with external impact, its eﬀects on
indoor air quality can be an enormous factor in household members’ morbidity and
mortality.7 Consider that perhaps eighty percent of world exposure to particulates
occurs indoors in developing countries (Smith 1993, p.551). Such exposure has severe
health consequences.8 With health eﬀects of this magnitude, and other disutility
from fuels’ emissions (such as smoke in one’s eyes), there is good reason to expect
to observe relevant income eﬀects upon fuels choices, since households do vary in
income and can be expected to value health gains from lower emissions.
Specifically, using household-level data from Pakistan, we estimate both disag-
gregated (natural gas, LPG, kerosene, wood, dung, and other biomass) and aggre-
gated (modern and traditional) fuel-use Engel curves. We then translate these into
eﬀects of income on indoor air quality. A benefit of explicitly modeling the under-
lying mechanism is apparent here, concerning appropriate estimation. The natural
first thought is that Tobit regression will adequately address the use/not and fuel-
quantity decisions adequately. Our household-production model9, however, makes
7 Indoor air pollution is often the dominant source of exposure because of the close proximity and
extended exposure of individuals to the sources. Smith (1993, p.541) makes this point clear: coal-
fired power plants in the United States produce 1.6 kg of particulates per person, while cigarettes
produce only 50g per person; however, as cigarette smoke is released so close to the lungs, and
is often trapped in the same volume of indoor air breathed by many people for many hours, it is
thousands of times more likely to reach people’s lungs, and produces exposures eighty times as high.
Smith (1987, p.145) points out: “...the exposures and nominal doses of major pollutants found in
biofuel smoke rival or exceed those received by active smokers for some pollutants.”
8For instance, from Smith 1987, p.vii: “...every day...14,000 children die from respiratory infec-
tion. The majority of these deaths result from severe acute respiratory illness (ARI)...those who
survive ARI...will be more susceptible to respiratory disease throughout their lives and are more
likely to suﬀer chronic obstructive lung diseases. ...exposure to emissions from biomass cooking and
heating fuels is an important contributing factor”. See also Wilson & Spengler (1996). For instance,
in a chapter in this volume, Dockery and Pope estimate that daily mortality increases 0.5-1.6% for
each 10 microgram per cubic meter increase in particulate concentrations. Pope (1989) describes
a case in which during the winter after a labor dispute had resulted in the closure of a local steel
mill–which had been the largest single source of particulate air pollution–PM10 concentrations
averaged 51 units compared with a mean of 90 the winter before, and children’s hospital admissions
for respiratory disease dropped by more than 50% compared with the previous year.
9Classic early references in the household production literature include Gorman 1980, Becker
1965, and Lancaster 1966a and 1966b. As our model is not the focus here and is the subject of
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clear that the decisions about whether to use a fuel, and how much to use, may react
quite diﬀerently to income. For ‘dirtier’ fuels, higher income lowers the likelihood of
using the fuel but, conditional on it being used, raises the quantity. This suggests
the need for a “generalized Tobit” approach to the estimation.
We find that as incomes rise, households transition from ‘traditional’ fuels to
‘modern’, cleaner fuels, in keeping with previous work on “energy ladders”. This
finding accords well with intuition that increases in household income may permit
improvements in indoor air quality. However, as per our model, such improvement
may not be mononotic. In fact, in simulations based on our estimates, under plausi-
ble assumptions on the ratio of traditional-fuel to modern-fuel emissions we find an
inverted-U relationship between emissions and income. In other words, increases in
income appear to be associated initially with a deterioration in indoor air quality as
consumption of energy services rises. Only after household income crosses a thresh-
old do subsequent increases in income lead to investments in cleaner fuels that yield
reductions in emissions and improvements in indoor air quality.
Finally, given this evidence that household preferences may be consistent with
EKC-like Engel curves for indoor air quality, we provide an illustration of how this
household-level approach can address the second question above, specifically how
households’ views get aggregated up through the political policy-making process.
When extended to a multi-agent setting with heterogeneous agents and external
eﬀects, our characterization of households can yield a non-monotonic aggregate re-
lationship between income and environmental quality that mirrors the household’s.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes the
household-production model from Pfaﬀ, Chaudhuri and Nye 2002a that seems ap-
propriate for this setting. We present the basic characteristics approach used to
model the demand for fuels, and describe how a non-monotonic Engel curve for
indoor air quality might arise naturally even when households value indoor air qual-
ity and preferences are such that air quality would be a normal good if it could
be directly purchased. Section 3 describes the data and presents descriptive sta-
tistics. The data come from the Pakistan Integrated Household Survey (PIHS),
one of a number of micro consumption datasets produced at least in part by the
World Bank within their Living Standards Measurement Surveys series of datasets.
The PIHS includes an energy module that permits study of fuels purchases as a
function of income and other household characteristics. Section 4 details our econo-
metric strategy, discusses various issues that arise in the estimation of fuel-use Engel
curves using data from a developing economy, and presents the estimates of fuel-
usage Engel curves and simulations. Section 5 then demonstrates the utility of such
household-level results with an illustrative model of how household preferences could
aggregate through voting for environmental policies. Section 6 concludes.
2. Household production model
Here we summarize Pfaﬀ, Chaudhuri and Nye 2002a, which provides derivations of
the conditions for EKCs. We begin with the observation that many environmen-
tal services (including indoor air quality) cannot be directly purchased. Rather,
households are endowed with positive amounts of these amenities, which are then
Pfaﬀ, Chaudhuri and Nye 2002a, see Section 2 below and that paper for extended discussions.
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degraded due to the use of marketed commodities. In many developing economies,
the consumption of firewood or kerosene results in the joint production of services
that households value (e.g., cooking, heating and lighting) and reductions in indoor
air quality. We formalize this point within a household-production, or characteristics
framework. We use the simplest possible model to demonstrate that non-monotonic
environmental Engel curves may arise, and to motivate our estimation approaches.
Let s denote a household’s consumption of cooking services, and a denote the
level of indoor air quality. Neither s nor a can be directly purchased. Instead, they
are jointly produced (in the case of a, degraded) through the use of marketed fuels.
Consider a situation in which households have a choice between two marketed fuels,
a “dirty” (more environmentally destructive) fuel d and a “clean” fuel c. Assuming
that s is generated linearly from the use of these fuels, we redefine the units in which
the fuels are measured so that total cooking services are given by:
s(~q) = qd + qc (2.1)
where ~q = (qd, qc) is the vector of quantities used of the dirty and clean fuels re-
spectively. Without losing any of the basic intuitions, we can also assume that the
degradation of indoor air quality a is fully linear in the marketed fuels. Thus, we
assume both that the total emissions level e is linear in the purchased fuels:
e(~q) = αqd + βqc (2.2)
where α > β > 0 (i.e., fuel d is indeed dirtier), and that indoor air quality is linear
in total emissions, where A is the initial air quality endowment and A > 0:
a(e) = A− e (2.3)
The household chooses the marketed ~q to maximize (2.4) subject to (2.5):
U(s, a) (2.4)
pdqd + pcqc = y (2.5)
where y is household income and pd and pc are, respectively, the per-unit (of cooking
services) prices of the dirty and clean goods (we also assume that pd < pc).
To provide a first intuition for the possibility of an EKC based on the fuels usage
decisions, ignore that the fuels demand functions may not be diﬀerentiable at all
incomes because of binding non-negativity constraints on fuels usage. Then we can













At first glance, this suggests that a must fall with y; all fuels q degrade a, and
fuels demands are surely normal. However, the fuels demands are derived demands,
given household preferences for s and a. Thus, they need not be normal. In fact,
within a characteristics/household production framework, inferior marketed goods
can be quite common (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980, Lipsey and Rosenbluth 1971).
If dirty fuels are inferior after a certain income, e.g., while clean fuels are normal,
it is possible that the Engel curve for indoor air quality will be U-shaped. More
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generally, the household-level relationship between income and indoor air quality
could take on any number of shapes, including a monotic rise in quality. This
indeterminacy is an attractive property given the contested aggregate evidence.
The illustrative example depicted in Figure 1 helps to provide some intuition.
The endowment (s = 0, a > 0) is at the upper left. Each dashed ray depicts
the combinations of indoor air quality a and cooking services s attainable through
exclusive use of one of the fuels. The solid lines connecting the rays are budget
constraints; larger budgets are further from the endowment. The budget slopes
indicate the relative shadow price of air quality and cooking, i.e. the rate at which
households can trade these two oﬀ, given the underlying technologies and the prices
of the marketed fuels. The negative slope reflects our assumption that dirtier fuels
are cheaper than cleaner fuels per unit of cooking service produced. The shape of
the indiﬀerence curves comes from the concavity of the utility function.
Figure 1 shows the optimal consumption points of the household at six levels
of income. The two transitions from point A to point C involve degradation of
environmental quality, at first through increased use of only the dirty fuel and then
while the clean fuel is also used. Juxtaposing the indiﬀerence curves with the budget
sets shows why in the lowest income transition from A to B, while the household
could substitute, it does not desire any of the clean fuel. Because the endowment
is so skewed towards air quality, moving as rapidly as possible to greater balance
of s and a is preferable. This dictates using only the dirty fuel. However, as
income continues to rise, the household does begin to use the clean fuel, at first
in combination with the dirty fuel and then exclusively. As the share of the clean
fuel rises, environmental quality, which had been deteriorating, begins to improve.
Eventually the household transitions into exclusive use of the modern fuel, at which
point further increases in income must yield reductions in environmental quality.
What does this behavior imply for observed fuels usage? Again, an illustrative
example makes the basic point (worked out in detail in Pfaﬀ, Chaudhuri and Nye
2002a). Figure 2 shows that at low incomes, cleaner fuels may not be used at all.
The likelihood of using cleaner fuels rises with income, and the later transitions
make clear that the quantity used of the cleaner fuel will also increase with income.
Note that when only the dirtier fuel is used, its quantity also increases with income.
Yet as income continues to rise, the likelihood of using the dirtier fuel at all will fall.
3. Data
3.1. Source & Overview
The data for this study is the Pakistan Integrated Household Survey (PIHS) 1991.10
The PIHS is a national survey, although it oversamples urban households.11 It in-
10The PIHS was designed and implemented jointly by the Federal Bureau of Statistics, Govern-
ment of Pakistan and the World Bank, and is one of a number of Living Standards Measurement
Study (LSMS) household surveys conducted in various developing economies with the assistance
of the World Bank. The purpose of these studies is to provide policy makers and researchers with
individual, household, and community level data that facilitate analysis of the impact of policy
initiatives on household living standards.
11The sample was drawn using a multi-state stratified sampling procedure from the Master Sample
Frame developed by the Federal Bureau of Statistics (FBS) based on the 1981 census. It covers all
four provinces, and according to the FBS, the areas excluded contain only about 4% of the national
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cludes individual and household-level data covering not only energy consumption
but also housing conditions, education, health, employment characteristics, self-
employment activity, consumption, migration, fertility, credit and savings. Thus it
permits us to attain our empirical goal of studying both the propensity to use tradi-
tional versus modern fuels at all and, conditional on useage, the quantity consumed
and how it moves with household income (controlling for other relevant variables).
For each of the 4,800 households the PIHS indicates whether a household uses
any of what we will call traditional fuels (dung, firewood, and biomass) and/or
any of what we will call modern fuels (kerosene, LPG, and natural gas), and in
particular whether these are used for cooking.12 In addition, several questions permit
calculation of the quantities of these fuels used for cooking (see Appendix A for
details). The PIHS also contains information on the following characteristics of
a family: household income, household size, number of adults in the household,
number of children in the household, household head’s age and education, number
of members of the household that have suﬀered respiratory problems. In addition,
we constructed variables which may aﬀect indoor air pollution exposure conditional
on fuel useage, including: whether the home is used as a place of work, whether
the family employs a servant to cook meals; where the cook cooks, the number of
rooms, whether windows are present, and whether the home has a chimney.
3.2. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents household and fuel-use statistics, and other relevant information.
Means are presented for the whole sample, as well as conditional on living in an
urban or rural area, or on being relatively rich or poor (above or below the median
income). Household incomes are over 75% higher in urban areas than in rural.
Urban homes have more rooms, and are less likely to be windowless. In terms of
fuel use (at all and for cooking), urban dwellers are more likely to use electricity,
natural gas and LPG, and less likely to use firewood, dung and biomass. Finally,
urban households are much less likely to collect their fuels (either wood or dung).
Richer households are smaller than poorer (due to fewer children). Their homes
have more rooms, and are less likely to be windowless. They are four times as likely
to use natural gas, and twice as likely to use LPG, but less likely to use firewood,
dung, and biomass (either at all or for cooking). Finally, richer households are
significantly less likely than poorer households to collect their fuels.13
The top half of Table 2 presents statistics on use of fuels for cooking, by income
quartile (expanding on the right-most columns of Table 1). The ”modern” fuels
(kerosene, LPG, natural gas) rise in use from poorer to richer quartiles, though
variation exists: kerosene usage rises at earlier incomes, while LPG and natural
gas rise more in the upper quartiles. The ”traditional” fuels (dung, firewood, other
biomass) fall in use from the poorer to the richer quartiles, though again variation
exists: the use of dung drops earlier, while biomass and firewood use drop only later.
population. The sample frame consists of three main domains (self-representing cities, other urban
areas, and rural areas), which are exclusively and exhaustively divided into primary sampling units.
12As seen in Table 1, note that while many households use electricity, almost none use it for
cooking (it is used mostly for lighting). Coal and charcoal were also not used for cooking.
13Missing from these statistics is indoor air quality. That is because it is not observed directly
(and thus is not in the survey). It is produced through household choices such as of fuel type and
quantity, and must be estimated from the fuel-use and engineering-technologies information.
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The bottom half of Table 2 presents information on the quantities used in cook-
ing. The quantities follow much the same pattern as the use decisions for the modern
fuels. For traditional fuels, in contrast, the quantities give a diﬀerent picture than
the binary use decisions, holding steady or rising as income rises.
This seems surprising, but note that quantities blend probability of use with
quantity conditional upon use. If for whatever reason a household continues to
use traditional fuels as it gets richer, it will use increasing amounts of traditional
fuels, as its consumption of fuels services will rise with income. That can explains
these descriptive statistics, and also suggests a ”generalized Tobit” approach to
estimation, in particular for the traditional fuels where the eﬀect of income on the
probability of use is of the opposite sign from that for quantity conditional on use.
Table 1 suggests one reason why some richer households use traditional fuels, a
lack of access to modern fuels. Over 80% of rural households use wood for cooking;
this must include some richer households. It makes sense that some rural areas do
not have access to some fuels. This motivates an additional issue in the estimation,
controlling for access to fuels in attempting to estimate the eﬀect of income.
Table 3 shows that overall less than half of all households in our sample use only
one fuel for cooking. Note that a non-negligible fraction of households even uses
three fuels for cooking. The bottom half of the table creates modern and traditional
groupings and reconsiders the use decisions in that light. These aggregated statistics
present much the same message as in Table 2: the use for cooking of groupings
involving only modern fuels rises from the poorest to the richest quartiles, the mix
of traditional fuels and kerosene first rises in the middle quartiles and then drops,
and the use of groupings involving only traditional fuels drops.
4. Econometric Issues, Estimation and Simulations
While our theory starts with a household’s preferences for non-marketed goods and
derives the demand for marketed fuels, our empirical strategy proceeds in the op-
posite direction. We begin by estimating Engel curves for the fuels and work back,
through simulations, to the revealed preferences for air quality and cooking/heating
services. Though fairly straightforward in principle, the practical implementation
of this strategy is complicated by a number of issues, at least some of which are
specific to the Pakistani context and to the data we use. We discuss these issues
below, next present our empirical specification and the results of our estimation,
and finally provide simulations of the income - indoor air quality relationship.
4.1. Econometric Issues
4.1.1. Defining access
In our data the use of modern fuels for cooking is extremely rare among rural house-
holds and among the poor. For instance, only 1% of rural households use natural
gas for cooking, while only 4% use LPG (i.e., cylinder) gas. The issue here is that
access to modern fuels is limited in many parts of Pakistan, especially rural areas
that simply lack natural gas connections or supplies of LPG. Some households, re-
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gardless of income, do not have the option of using modern fuels.14 And in some
of the largest cities, traditional fuels such as firewood and dung may not be read-
ily available. Because the inclusion of households who lack access can potentially
obscure the eﬀect of income, these households need to be identified and dropped.
There is, unfortunately, no clean way of identifying them in our data. The
survey has a question on access and availability for each fuel but a large number of
those responses are missing. In the case of electricity, only 17% of the households
reported having access–the other responses being missing or negative–whereas
76% of households are observed using electricity. Simply dropping households who
do not use a particular fuel is not a solution, since of course there will be households
who have access to that fuel but simply choose not to use it.
We resolve this by dropping those households who live in ‘areas’ where no house-
holds use the fuel in question. Our definitions of ‘area’ are based on the sampling
frame for the survey. Loosely speaking, in rural areas adjoining villages in the same
division of a province are classified as being in the same area. In large cities, wealthy,
middle income, and poor neighborhoods are treated as separate areas. In the case
of other urban areas (i.e., towns with populations between 5,000 and 500,000), ad-
joining towns in the same division of a province are aggregated into ‘areas’.
4.1.2. Fuel collection and household production
A feature of a number of developing agrarian economies is that many commodities
that a household consumes are produced by the household or instead are “collected”.
Table 1 reflects this–32% of the sample report collecting firewood and 21% report
collecting dung. The proportions are higher in rural areas. Almost all other biomass
is either collected or obtained as the byproduct of agricultural cultivation. Dung is
also obtained as the byproduct of animal husbandry activities.
That some ‘marketed’ fuels are not always purchased raises conceptual issues on
two fronts. First, without an observed market transaction the eﬀective price of the
fuel has to be imputed. There are several ways this might be done, none of which are
entirely satisfactory. A common approach is to assign the average market price of
the fuel in the community. With home-produced fuels, especially those obtained as
the byproducts of other activities–e.g. crop byproducts from cultivation or dung
from animal husbandry–this seems reasonable. However, for fuel collection for
consumption, valuation at market prices potentially overstates the ‘price’ faced by
the household. The opportunity cost of the time collecting is presumably lower than
the market price–it would not otherwise make sense to be collecting.
An alternative approach is to price the collected fuel in terms of the opportunity
costs of the time spent in collection. Determining the appropriate opportunity
cost can, however, be diﬃcult. A natural option might be to value the time spent
collecting fuel by a household member at the average wage rate for that member’s
demographic category (i.e., males, females, children). But this seems inappropriate
in a setting where underemployment is likely to be significant.
Again, we have no clean way of resolving this issue. The measures of income that
we use include the imputed value of the time spent collecting firewood, and may
14Households can in principle choose where to live. Thus ‘lack of access’ in some sense reflects
household preferences. However, as the residential location choice of households is influenced by so
many other factors, treating ‘access’ as exogenous here seems to us a reasonable assumption.
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therefore overestimate the incomes of poorer households. Given that, to avoid any
spurious correlation that could be generated by incorrectly imputing values both for
income and for our dependent variable, e.g. for the expenditures on collected fuels,
we estimate the fuel-use Engel curves with quantities as the dependent variable.
4.1.3. Controlling for prices
The conceptual diﬃculties in appropriately defining fuel prices are compounded by
the fact that for many households expenditures on modern fuels are simply not
reported. While we use quantities as our dependent variable for the Engel curves,
we cannot ignore the fact that we do not observe prices, since omitting prices from
the Engel curves may introduce biases in the estimated income coeﬃcients.
Whether it would depends on whether prices and incomes are correlated. A
positive correlation between price and income might arise from unobserved quality
variation. If higher income households use higher quality fuels that cost more, they
may cut down on the quantity consumed. A negative correlation might arise because
“access costs” are lower in richer areas. In either case, with incomplete controls for
prices income would pick up some of the price eﬀect, biasing its coeﬃcient.
We use area and month fixed eﬀects to control for price variation. Areas are
defined as mentioned above (see Section 4.1.1) when discussing the issue of access.
The month fixed eﬀects are controlling for the month in which the household was
interviewed, and this may partially control for seasonal price variations.
4.1.4. Substitutability across and aggregation of fuels
An interesting feature of the fuel choice behavior in the PIHS is that for most fuels,
at a given level of income we observe both households with significant consumption
and households with zero consumption. For example, while low income household
are less likely to use natural gas, some low income households use a lot of wood and
no dung, while others use a lot of dung and no wood. This reflects the fact that
wood and dung are relatively good substitutes within the traditional fuels.
Substitutability within categories of fuels raises the issue of the appropriate level
of aggregation of the fuels for estimation. In estimating Engel curves for each fuel,
we ignore information about the other fuels used by the households. For instance,
in the wood-use equation, the Tobit estimation procedure tries to fit a regression
line that accomodates both high-income households who use no wood as well as
low-income households who use no wood, without recognizing that in the former
case the households use natural gas instead, whereas in the latter, the households
use dung. What this does is raise the estimate of the variance of the disturbance
term in the Tobit regression, and potentially biases the income coeﬃcient.
To address this problem, we aggregate the fuels into two categories: modern
(i.e., natural gas, LPG, and kerosene), which in this context represents the “clean”
fuel, and traditional (wood, dung, and other biomass), here considered the “dirty”
fuel. We exclude coal and charcoal, as they are little used, and electricity, as it
is almost never used for cooking. We use conversion factors from HESS (1993) to
convert our varied fuel-quantity measures into a common energy unit, megajoules,
and estimate Engel curves for traditional-fuel and modern-fuel megajoules. We
have estimated the disaggregated-fuels Tobit regressions, and are happy to provide
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them. However, given the aggregation issue, income eﬀects in those results that
match the aggregated-fuels Tobits, and the value of further exploration including of
the Tobit - “generalized Tobit” specification choice, we focus on the results for the
aggregated-fuels categories.
4.2. Estimation: fuel-use Engel curves
4.2.1. Specification
We estimate the following equations for each of the two aggregated fuel categories,
traditional and modern:




h + ²h (4.1)
qh = α+ β1yh + β2(yh)
2 + β3(yh)
3 + β4(yh)





For each category, the dependent variable, qh, is the total quantity (measured in
megajoules) of fuels consumed in that category per month per capita by household
h. The key independent variable is yh, monthly per-capita expenditures, while dh
represents household size and Mmh and A
k
h are dummy variables for month and area
(i.e., spatial) fixed eﬀects.15 The first specification provides a benchmark, while the
second, in which we include a polynomial in yh to allow for possible non-linearities,
is our preferred specification.
Given the frequent censoring at zero of fuel use, even for the aggregated-fuels
categories, our first estimation approach is a maximum-likelihood Tobit procedure.
Since Tobit estimation with fixed eﬀects requires at least one non-zero observation
per fixed-eﬀect unit, the inclusion of area eﬀects automatically forces us to exclude
all households from areas where none of the households in our sample use the fuel
in question. As noted, this also is how we deal with the issue of access.
These Tobits function as a benchmark, especially for the traditional fuels. Tobit’s
single index function (single Xβ) assumes that the eﬀects of explanatory factors on
the probability of use are the same as upon the quantity used given any use. As
seen above, and as in theory (Pfaﬀ, Chaudhuri and Nye 2002a), this is not likely
to be appropriate for traditional fuels. Higher income lowers the probability of
using traditional fuels, but conditional upon use it raises the quantity, as richer
households consume more fuels services. For modern fuels this does not arise, since
the expectation (supported by the descriptive statistics) is that higher income raises
both the probability of use and the quantity used conditional upon use.
Cragg 1971 considers the excessive restrictiveness of the Tobit specification, and
proposes one approach to “generalized Tobit” (a term used in varied ways). We
implement his approach, which involves separating the probit (use/nonuse) and
15We use per-capita expenditure rather than income because incomes can be quite variable in
this setting. The literature on intertemporal consumption behavior suggests that household con-
sumption decisions (of which fuel choices are a subset) are more likely to reflect long-run average
income. If households smooth consumption in the face of income fluctuations, expenditures will
be a better proxy for average income than actual income in any given period. We have also esti-
mated these equations using per-capita income as the key explanatory variable. The results were
not qualitatively diﬀerent. Both the household income and the household expenditures measures
we use below were created as part of the PIHS. Its construction is discussed in the PIHS Basic
Information document.
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truncated (quantity conditional on use) regressions. Previewing Table 4, for tra-
ditional fuels a likelihood ratio test comparing Cragg with Tobit always soundly
rejects the Tobit. The gains from this additional flexibility are not surprising, given
the clear theoretical predictions and the descriptive statistics for traditional fuels.
4.2.2. Aggregated fuel-use Engel curves
Table 4 presents our estimated fuels-usage Engel curves, for traditional and modern
fuel aggregates. Recall, the dependent variables are quantity used per capita, in
a unit of measure common to the two fuels categories, total megajoules (denoted
“BTUs” in the table). The top half of the table presents regressions for traditional-
fuel BTUs, while the bottom half concerns modern fuels. All runs include month and
spatial fixed eﬀects. Both the linear benchmark and the more general polynomial
specifications are presented. Within each specification (linear to the left, polynomial
to the right), three runs are shown. The first is the Tobit, which estimates a single
index function for both the probability of use and the quantity conditional on use.
The others are Cragg’s probit and truncated regressions, the combination of which
permits the use and quantity decisions to react diﬀerently to income.
The major findings are: i) evidence of a clear transition from traditional to mod-
ern fuels as per-capita household expenditure rises; and ii) evidence that, consistent
with what the basic theory would have led us to expect, the more flexible estimation
approach of Cragg (1971) reveals more clearly the nature of the transition.
The Cragg results indicate that for modern fuels, both the probability of use
and the quantity used separately rise with expenditure. Not surprisingly, therefore,
the standard Tobit estimate (blending use with quantity) also indicates significant
positive eﬀects of per-capita household expenditure on modern fuels.16
But does higher income lead households to drop traditional fuels? Here the
Tobit evidence is ambiguous, a significant negative eﬀect in the linear specification
but a positive one in the fourth-order polynomial. This ambiguity is not surprising,
since the single set of Tobit coeﬃcients must blend the falling likelihood of using
traditional fuels with the rising quantity used conditional on non-zero use. This dif-
ficulty is made clear by the Cragg generalized Tobit results. The Probit regressions
for traditional fuel use yield consistently significant negative expenditure eﬀects.
On the other hand, the truncated regressions indicate that conditional on the use
of traditional fuels, the quantity used rises with per-capita expenditure. Likelihood
ratio tests confirm that for both the linear and the quartic specifications, the Cragg
generalized Tobit model provides a better fit than the standard Tobit model.
Turning to the other controls, for all the estimation runs the area and month
eﬀects are (highly) jointly significant, indicating systematic spatial and seasonal
variation in access and fuel prices. More interestingly, household size appears to be,
statistically, a very important influence on fuel-choice and fuel-use decisions. Recall
that the dependent variable is per capita use of fuels. Thus the fact that larger
16For the quartic specification, this is true for the income range we observe in the data. We
calculated the predicted expected value of fuel use at the average estimated area and month eﬀect,
and for various household sizes. We held these constant as we varied expenditure to trace out an
Engel curve. Thus our predictions do not include a forecast of changes in access or more generally,
any changes in unobserved price components as per-capita expenditure (and income) rises (which
would be reflected in changes in the area eﬀects). Nor did we allow for systematic changes in
household size with increases in per-capita expenditure levels.
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households will, in general, use more fuel does not imply a positive prior for the
household-size variable.
Our basic results regarding the influence on fuels choices of household size are
as follows: controlling for per-capita household expenditure, larger households are
less likely to use traditional fuels and also use lower quantities per-capita when they
do use it. On the other hand, larger households are more likely to use modern fuels
but, as with traditional fuels, use lower quantities per-capita.
4.2.3. Interpreting the evidence: household size
How should we interpret these eﬀects? Within the context of our model above
(and natural extensions), three explanations come to mind. First, it is possible and
perhaps even likely that there are economies of scale in the generation of cooking
and other services from fuels. It clearly does not require five times as much fuel (and
energy) to cook for a household of five than it does to cook for a single individual.17
Such economies of scale, combined with the fact that the number of equivalent
adults is unlikely to increase one-for-one with the number of household members
including children (our measure of household size), would explain why, controlling
for per-capita household expenditure and conditional on use, per-capita quantities
of fuel use decline with household size for both modern and traditional fuels.
Second, larger households may also realize scale economies in other types of
consumption activities. That would imply a positive “income” eﬀect of increases in
household size on quantities of fuel use, though also a negative “substitution” eﬀect
relative to other types of consumption. Were the substitution eﬀect to dominate,
again the quantities per-capita of both modern and traditional fuels would be lower
for larger households (an eﬀect that can not be distinguished from the story just
above). However, were the income eﬀect to dominate–and whether it does will, in
general, depend on the magnitude of the scale economies realized in the generation of
cooking services relative to those in other consumption activities, and on the relevant
income and price elasticities of demand–per-capita quantities of both types of fuel
use would rise with household size.18 The negative coeﬃcients on household size in
the fuel-quantity regressions suggest that such an income eﬀect does not dominate
both the substitution eﬀect and any economies of scale in fuel-service provision.
Our third explanation extends our model in Section 2 above by noting that
indoor air quality is a local (i.e., intra-household) public good. Therefore, the larger
the household, the greater the benefits of improving indoor air quality by switching
to cleaner modern fuels.19 Unlike the two stories just above, this suggests a clear
prior for the eﬀects of household size in the Probit, probability-of-use regressions.
Controlling for per-capita expenditure, larger households should be less likely to use
17While our regressions focus on cooking, more generally this sort of dissipation eﬀect is relevant
for fuels services. For instance, a fire generates heat and light, of which a significant share goes
directly to the empty spaces of the household, not enjoyed by anybody. The more people around
to absorb those benefits, the lower the share of dissipated services. Thus, larger households do not
need as much fuel per capita for a given level of services per capita.
18Deaton and Paxson (1998), which looks at the relationship between per-capita food expendi-
tures and household size, provides a detailed discussion of how economies of scale in consumption
might interact with household size and composition.
19While for space reasons we do not do so here, it is simple enough to add this feature to our
model in Section 2, arriving at this comparative static for the number of people in the household.
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traditional and more likely to use modern fuels, as we find in Table 4.20
This third, environmental story also has implications for the per-capita quantity
regressions. Concern about indoor air quality may dampen quantities of use of
both traditional and modern fuels, reinforcing the negative eﬀects of any economies
of scale in the generation of cooking services, or a dominant substitution eﬀect of
economies of scale in other consumption activities. However, we would expect that
for this third story, the dampening of fuel use might be stronger for traditional
fuels, because each additional unit of traditional fuel leads to a larger deterioration
in indoor air quality. That would explain the greater magnitude and significance of
the negative household size eﬀect in the traditional fuels regressions in Table 4.
4.2.4. Interpreting the evidence: household composition
The discussion above suggests that the estimated fuel-use Engel curves are consistent
with the simple model we presented earlier in which we assumed that households
value indoor air quality and that this concern influences fuel choice and use decisions.
But they might also be consistent with some other explanation, in particular, one
in which latent preferences for indoor air quality are not part of the story.
The leading candidate for such an explanation centers on possible fixed costs in
the use of modern fuels, coupled with lower per-service-unit costs of modern fuels.
In an environment characterized by credit market imperfections, the presence of
such fixed costs could explain why the likelihood of modern fuel use increases with
the level of per-capita household expenditure. The results regarding the influence
of household size on fuel-choice could similarly be reconciled with a pure fixed costs
story in that the eﬀective per-capita price (inclusive of fixed costs) of modern fuels,
is, by definition, lower in larger households, implying that controlling for per-capita
expenditure, larger households should be more likely to use modern fuels.
Empirically speaking, fixed costs are likely to be relevant. To use LPG cylinders
for cooking, households need to buy a gas burner, whose price can be a significant
portion of average household income. They may also have to pay upfront deposits
for cylinders. Likewise, to use kerosene households need to replace traditional mud
ovens with kerosene stoves. Thus this explanation bears consideration.
However, two observations suggest that fixed costs alone cannot explain the
behavior we observe. First, the empirical validity of the other essential ingredient of
a pure fixed-costs explanation–that the variable costs (per unit of cooking services)
of modern fuels be lower than those of traditional fuels–is questionable. We do not
directly observe these costs. But in this setting, where many traditional fuels are
collected and the opportunity costs of the time collecting are likely to be low in terms
of foregone income because of involuntary unemployment and the use of child and
female labor, the per-service-unit cost of modern fuels may well be higher for many
households. Second, if fixed costs were the sole driver of the observed fuel-choice
transition, we should not observe households using both traditional and modern
fuels, but 12% of our sample do so (and some use multiple modern fuels).
We can also provide some direct evidence that concerns about indoor air quality
20To the extent that a switch to modern fuels increases the overall fuel bill of the household, such
behavior would provide one potential explanation for the paradoxical finding highlighted by Deaton
and Paxson (1998), namely that , controlling for per-capita household expenditure, per-capita food
expenditure levels decline noticeably with household size.
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do play a role in household fuel-choice decisions. For instance, Smith (1987) cites
studies in Guatemala, Nepal, and India, which report that in post-adoption surveys
households indicated that smoke exposure reductions were an important element in
their decision to adopt cleaner-burning stoves. In our data, of the households who
responded, 69% reported being irritated by smoke from cooking activities. If nothing
else, these survey findings indicate that households are aware of the implications of
their fuel choice decisions for indoor air quality.
Table 5 provides more formal evidence that the observed fuel-choice and fuel-
usage behavior of households is at least partially driven by concerns about indoor
air quality. We report there the results of probit regressions of traditional and
modern fuel use that are similar to the fifth column of Table 4, except that now
the household size variable is disaggregated into separate counts of adult males,
adults females, boys and girls (under age 15) in the household. The top panel
reports estimates generated using the full sample, while the bottom panel reports
estimates from the sub-sample of urban households as a further robustness check
and to alleviate any concerns that results are being driven by rural-urban diﬀerences
in levels of access and prices.
The results indicate that more than household size, household composition mat-
ters for the choice of fuels used by the household. In particular, controlling for
per-capita expenditure, the greater the number of women in the household, the less
likely it is that the household uses traditional fuel and the more likely it is to use
modern fuels.21 The only other significant eﬀect (at the 5% or 10% level) is the im-
pact of an increase in the number of girls, which reduces the likelihood of traditional
fuel use. The presence of more men in the household also makes it less likely that
the household uses traditional fuels, but the eﬀect is not significant.
It is diﬃcult to reconcile these composition eﬀects with a straightforward pure
fixed-costs-based explanation. The presence of fixed costs suggests a direct role in
influencing fuel choices only for total household size. But if households care about
indoor air quality, household composition eﬀects may arise, should the valuation of
this intra-household public good vary across household members. In this setting,
women do most if not all of the cooking, and as a result are more directly exposed
to the indoor air pollution that results from fuels use.22 Therefore, it should not
be surprising that the greater the number of women in the household, the greater
the value placed on improving indoor air quality, and the more likely it is that the
household will switch from traditional fuels to modern fuels.
4.3. Predicting the income-indoor air quality relationship
What do the observed fuels choice imply about the relationship between per-capita
expenditure levels and indoor air quality? We do not observe indoor air quality
at the household level. Thus, for this analysis we resort to a hybrid strategy of
21Note that neither result necessarily implies the other because of the presence of households who
use both types of fuels.
22Moreover, a number of studies (e.g., Thomas (1990), Behrman (1997)) suggest that mothers
care more about the health of their children than do fathers. Because the health of children,
and especially daughters who may assist the mother in cooking is adversely eﬀected by indoor air
pollution, that would–assuming a larger number of women implies an increase in the influence of
women in household decisions–provide another explanation for our finding that the presence of
women and girls decreases the likelihood of traditional fuel use.
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estimation with partially simulated data. We use the data on the quantities (qh)
of modern and traditional fuels used by the households to construct alternative
versions of an index that reflects the level of indoor air pollution for the household.
Let qth and q
m
h denote, respectively, the quantities of traditional and modern
fuels used by household h. We assume that the function linking these levels of fuel
use to the indoor air pollution experienced by the household, eph, takes the form:
eph = ³ρqth´θ + (qmh )θ (4.2)
where ρ is a parameter indicating the ratio of emissions (of pollutants) from tradi-
tional fuels to those from modern fuels, and θ is a parameter indicating the degree
and direction of non-linearity with which emissions accumulate and translate into
pollution within the household.23 The higher the value of ρ, the more polluting
traditional fuels are assumed to be, relative to modern fuels. We consider values of
ρ ranging from 5 to 200. A value of θ > 1 (< 1) implies that the emissions function
is convex (concave), i.e., that the marginal increase in pollution associated with each
additional unit of fuel use rises (falls) with the level of fuel use. Whether emissions
functions are concave or convex is likely to vary by setting, and is largely an empir-
ical matter. From a theoretical perspective, convexity turns out to be a suﬃcient
condition for non-monotonic environmental Engel curves (see Pfaﬀ, Chaudhuri and
Nye 2002b) and that is what we assume in the theoretical voting example in the
next section. For the empirical results of this section, however, it seems important
to consider a full range of values of θ, so below we use from 0.25 to 1.5.
For each of the combinations of ρ and θ that we consider, we use the implied
values of indoor-air pollution to estimate the following equation:
eph = α+β1yh+β2(yh)2+β3(yh)3+β4(yh)4+β5dh+ΣmγmMmh +ΣkδkAkh+²h (4.3)
where, as in (4.1) above, yh is the per-capita level of household expenditure, dh is
household size, and Mmh and A
k
h are sets of month and area eﬀects. We use the
estimates to predict the relationship between income and indoor air pollution.
Figures 3-6 plot these predicted relationships for diﬀerent combinations of ρ and
θ.24 Figure 3 displays the predicted relationship (and associated standard error
band) for the combination ρ = 100, θ = 0.5. Indoor air pollution rises initially
with increases in household expenditure but quickly levels oﬀ, and is more or less
constant for a wide intermediate range of per-capita expenditure levels. Beyond a
point, however, further increases in household expenditure levels are associated with
a decline in the level of pollution. For this particular combination of parameters,
therefore, the predicted relationship at the household level is an inverted-U.
Figures 4, 5 and 6 indicate that, with exceptions, a similar inverted-U relation-
ship emerges to a lesser or greater extent for the combinations of parameters that
23We also considered a related functional form in which we assumed that any non-linearity in
the function translating emissions into pollution applied to the sum of the emissions from the two
diﬀerent sources. Because the results we obtained were not substantively diﬀerent, we do not report
them here.
24 In generating the predicted relationships, we fixed the household size at its mean for our
sample, 7, and set the month and area eﬀects to their estimated average values. Note also that the
predicted levels of indoor air pollution at diﬀerent levels of per-capita household expenditure have
been normalized relative to the level at the lowest level of household expenditure.
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we explored, in the range of household expenditures we observe in our sample. Fig-
ures 4 plots the predicted relationships under alternative assumptions regarding the
ratio of emissions from traditional fuels to those from modern fuels, for two separate
values of θ, 0.5 and 1. Holding constant the degree of non-linearity in the function
linking emissions to indoor air pollution, the smaller the assumed diﬀerence in the
emissions generated by the two types of fuels, the higher the household expenditure
level at which indoor air pollution starts to fall, and the greater the initial increase
in indoor air pollution before the subsequent decline.
Figures 5 and 6 plot the predicted relationship under diﬀerent assumptions re-
garding the degree and direction of non-linearity in the generation of pollution from
emissions, holding fixed the ratio of emissions from traditional fuels to those from
modern fuels.25 In Figure 5, this ratio is assumed to be 100, while in Figure 6, it
is assumed to be only 5. These figures indicate that greater concavity (i.e., lower
values of the non-linearity parameter, θ) dampens the initial increase in pollution
levels and widens the range of household expenditures for which pollution levels
remain more or less constant or even increase slightly. In fact, in Figure 6, the two
cases which assume the greatest concavity (θ = 0.25 and θ = 0.10), are the two we
alluded to earlier, for which we do not observe an inverted-U.
To sum up, our quasi-simulations indicate that for a wide range of plausible
parameter values, the fuel-choice and fuel-use decisions of the households in our
sample imply an inverted-U relationship between levels of indoor air pollution and
per-capita household expenditures. This finding, while interesting in that it mirrors
some of the empirical findings at the aggregate level, is however, itself less important
than the evidence we present in Tables 4 and 5 which indicates that households do
care about indoor air quality and can be expected to take actions to improve it.
5. Aggregating Household Preferences Through Voting
Household fuel choice decisions provided a natural arena for our empirical analysis
because the environmental impacts of these decisions are largely internalized, oﬀer-
ing some hope of that we might uncover latent preferences towards the environment.
From a theoretical perspective, however, the particular characterization of house-
hold preferences we adopted and provide empirical support for is quite general and
suggests the building blocks for a theory of aggregate EKCs even when environmen-
tal impacts are purely external and households are heterogeneous. We demonstrate
this in this section by means of a simple illustrative model.
5.1. Household preferences and abatement technologies
Consider an economy with a large number of households with varying income levels.
Household preferences are described by the utility function U(c, q) where c is the
household’s consumption of a composite good, and q is the level of environmental
25 In addition to the 4 values of θ for which the results are displayed in Figure 5, we considered
values of θ ranging up to 1.5. The shape of the predicted relationship in all these cases mirrors that
for the case where θ is assumed to be 1.1, but with much larger initial increases and subsequent
declines. To keep the scale of the vertical axis comparable to those of the other figures, we do not
display the results for these higher values of θ.
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quality the household enjoys. We make the standard assumptions that:
(i) Uc > 0 (ii) Ucc < 0 (iii) Uq > 0 (iv) Uqq < 0 (v) Ucq > 0
(vi) UqqUcc − U2qq > 0 (vii) lim
c→0Uc(c, q) = +∞ (5.1)
Now suppose that the environmental quality that a household enjoys depends not
just on its own consumption level and abatement expenditures–as above–but also
on the consumption and abatement of other households.26 Let C denote overall
consumption in the economy, and A denote aggregate abatement expenditures. The
environmental quality enjoyed by a household h is then qh = q(A,C). We assume
that:
(i) qA > 0 (ii) qAA < 0 (iii) qC < 0 (iv) qCC < 0 (v) qAC > 0
(vi) qAAqCC − q2AC > 0 (vii) q(0, 0) = Q > 0 (5.2)
If the number of households is large enough so that each individual household ignores
its eﬀects on environmental quality, it is clear that no single household will choose to
independently incur any abatement expenditures. And in that case, in the absence of
any collective choice mechanism, as incomes grow and consumption levels increase,
environmental quality will continually and monotonically decline.
However, the literature on local public goods shows that simple voting mecha-
nisms can coordinate individual decisions. We consider a simple voting scheme, a
majority voting procedure on a proportional income tax rate, where it is understood
that the proceeds of the tax will be used to finance public abatement expenditures.
5.2. Rising preferred tax rates and the median voter theorem
Imagine that each household calculates its preferred tax rate by solving:
max
0≤t≤1
V (t; y) = U((1− t)y, q(tY, (1− t)Y ) (5.3)
where y is the household’s income, t is the proportional tax rate, and Y is aggregate
income. The first-order condition for this maximization problem is:
yUc ≥ UqY [qA − qC ] (5.4)
which holds with equality if t > 0.. Let t∗(y;Y,Q) ∈ [0, 1] denote the preferred tax
rate of a household with income y. The assumptions (5.1) and (5.2) ensure:27
t∗(y;Y,Q) = 0 for all y ≤ by(Y,Q) (5.5)
where by(Y,Q) is implicitly defined by:
byUc(by, q(0, Y )) = Uq(by, q(0, Y ))Y [qA(0, Y )− qC(0, Y )] (5.6)
26 In this more general context we adopt a more general representation of the abatement technol-
ogy and abatement expenditures than we did in Section 2. Fuel-switching represents a particular
form of abatement, with the “abatement expenditures” being the increased cost of obtaining ser-
vices implied by the switch from cheaper and dirtier traditional fuels to cleaner but more expensive
modern fuels.
27The proof is straightforward. Details are provided in Pfaﬀ, Chaudhuri and Nye 2002b.
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The intuition behind this result exactly parallels that in the single-agent-no-external-
eﬀects setting we described earlier. At low levels of income, and with an initial
positive endowment of environment quality, households are unwilling to pay taxes







+ 1]− Uqc(1− t)Y [qA − qC ]
UqqY 2[qA − qC ]2 − 2yY Ucq[qA − qC ] + y2Ucc + UqY 2[qAA − 2qAC + qCC ]
(5.7)
The denominator of (5.7) is negative given the assumed concavity of U(c, q) and
(5.2). Standard assumptions about preferences do not, however, pin down the sign
of the numerator. But if we make the additional assumption that:
−cUcc
Uc
> 1 for all c (5.8)
the numerator will also be negative, and the preferred tax rate rises (weakly)
monotonically with household income. This additional assumption essentially en-
sures that preferences for consumption are suﬃciently elastic.28 Then, as incomes
and pollution increase, households are willing to devote a higher share of their in-
comes to abatement, by voting for higher proportional income tax rates.
Since preferences are single-peaked, and the preferred tax rises (weakly) monoton-
ically with income, the median voter theorem applies. The tax rate which will emerge
from the simple majority voting procedure is the tax rate preferred by the median
voter, in this case the household with the median level of household income.
5.3. Comparative statics
Let ym denote the median household income. The prevailing tax rate will be given by
t∗(ym;Y,Q). Note that Y and Q aﬀect the prevailing tax rate through two channels:
the threshold level of income below which a tax rate of zero will be preferred; and
the magnitude of the preferred tax rate when the tax rate is positive.
The framework presented here generates a rich set of comparative static eﬀects,
and in particular, suggests that the link between economic growth and the envi-
ronment is multifaceted, varying with the specifics of the growth process and the
particular environmental amenity of interest. That in turn has obvious implications
for empirical analyses using aggregate data. For instance, we can trace through the
partial eﬀect–everything else held constant–of an increase in the endowment of
environmental quality on the tax rate, the level of abatement expenditures and the
ultimate level of environmental quality. Such an exercise is useful in thinking about
how policy might diﬀer across environmental amenities with diﬀering endowments.
To see this, write:
q(A,C) = q(t∗(ym;Y,Q)Y, (1− t∗(ym;Y,Q))Y )
from which we get:
∂q(t∗(ym;Y,Q)Y, (1− t∗(ym;Y,Q))Y )
∂Q
= [qA − qC ]Y ∂t
∗(ym;Y,Q)
∂Q
28Stokey (1998) requires such an assumption for an EKC in a representative agent framework,
given a specific abatement technology. Pfaﬀ, Chaudhuri and Nye 2002b do not require this.
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Or we might ask, what happens to environmental quality when aggregate income
increases but growth is concentrated in the top half of the income distribution–i.e.,
the median level of income remains unchanged. Here the relevant expression would
be:






Alternately we might be interested in the eﬀects on environmental quality of an
increase in the median level of household income, holding fixed the overall level of
income, an exercise which is suggestive of (but obviously need not guarantee) an
increase in income equality. And in that case the relevant expression would be:
∂q(t∗(ym;Y,Q)Y, (1− t∗(ym;Y,Q))Y )
∂ym
= [qA − qC ]Y ∂t
∗(ym;Y,Q)
∂ym
And finally we might consider the impact of income growth when it is equipropor-
tionately distributed, implying that the ratio of ym to Y remains unchanged.
5.4. An illustrative example
To convey the sorts of results this framework can yield, we briefly work through this
last comparative static, drawing upon the detailed example that appears in Pfaﬀ,
Chaudhuri and Nye 2002b. We assume that environmental quality is given by:
q = Q+ γA− δC γ, δ > 0 (5.9)
Let aggregate income, Y, be a multiple, N of the median household income, ym, in
the economy at some initial point, and assume that all subsequent growth is equi-
proportionately distributed, or in other words, that the ratio N remains unchanged
over time. Household preferences are as described above.
As in (5.6), by(Q,Y ) is the threshold level of income below which a household will
prefer a tax rate of zero. Our assumptions about preferences imply that as aggregate
income falls to zero, by(Q, Y ) goes to infinity. As income goes to infinity, by goes to
zero, while in between by falls monotonically with aggregate income. Thus, there
exists a yl such that for ym < yl, a tax rate of zero is preferred (t∗(ym;Y,Q) = 0).
Thus, there are no tax-financed public abatement expenditures, and the eﬀect of
increasing income is to raise consumption levels and lower environmental quality.
To characterize the impact of increases in ym beyond the threshold yl, we begin
by noting that ∆ ≡ γt − δ(1 − t) represents the direct impact of an increase in
aggregate income Y on environmental quality, given an initial tax rate of t. We
show that if ∆ < 0, as will be the case at low values of t, the preferred tax rate
for a household with income y rises with aggregate income Y . Even if their own
incomes are unchanged, households recognize that aggregate incomes have increased
and that, at the existing tax rate, increased aggregate income has a negative net
impact on the environment. Each household is therefore willing to at least partially
oﬀset the deterioration in environmental quality through an increase in the tax rate.
From t = 0 at the threshold yl, the preferred tax rate will rise with increases in






Whether, beyond this point, the preferred tax rate continues to rise monotonically
depends on the particular specification of preferences and values of γ and δ. However,
the preferred tax rate cannot fall below the level in (5.10) as long as ym remains
above yh.
Next we consider the impact of increasing median income on environmental
quality. Holding fixed aggregate income, as ym rises, the median household prefers a
higher tax rate, which unambiguously improves environmental quality, by lowering
aggregate consumption and increasing public abatement expenditures. But an in-
crease in ym also implies an increase in aggregate income, since Y = Nym. This has
a direct impact ∆ plus an indirect impact realized through the change in the pre-
ferred tax rate induced by the increase in Y . When ym is below the upper threshold
yh, the net impact is ambiguous. However, it is easily verified that once ym crosses
the upper-threshold yh, subsequent increases in ym (and hence, Y ) unambiguously
improve environmental quality. Thus, except for an intermediate region where the
relationship between income growth and environmental quality is indeterminate,
the overall relationship broadly mirrors the non-monotonic relationship emphasized
by the empirical work on environmental Kuznets curves. That is, there exist two
thresholds, yl and yh where 0 < yl < yh, such that environmental quality falls with
income when median income is below yl and rises when median income is above yh.
6. Conclusion
Indoor air quality is a major health issue in developing countries, one driven by
households’ fuels choices. This paper empirically characterized fuels choices, for in-
sights into the behavioral linkages between household preferences, levels of income,
and environmental degradation. First we showed in a simple household-production
model why, if indoor air quality is a normal (or a luxury) good, the possibility
of “household-level EKCs” (i.e., non-monotonic Engel curves for indoor air qual-
ity) arises quite naturally. Then for traditional and modern fuel aggregates, we
provided evidence of a transition as household income rises from traditional fuels
(dung, wood, other biomass) to modern (kerosene, LPG, natural gas). Using plau-
sible assumptions regarding the emissions implied by fuel use, we found that these
observed household behaviors implied a U-shaped relationship between indoor air
quality and household income. That is, increases in income initially lead to a de-
terioration in air quality, but later lead to increased air quality. This evidence is
of particular interest given the rarity of cases in which households significantly in-
ternalize pollution impacts, revealing their valuation of environmental quality, here
indoor air quality which is so significant for health.
The EKC (“environmental Kuznets curve”) literature presents cross-national
statistical analyses linking income and ambient air quality. Such analyses are unable
to distinguish any particular mechanism through which such a result might come
about, although explanations (such as Seldon and Song’s ”regulatory J curve”) have
been oﬀered in terms of political-economic mechanisms and sectoral adjustment pat-
terns. A natural question is what can be taken from this paper that is of relevance
to that literature. Our first response is to concede that we have not performed
the explicit empirical aggregation which would directly tie our household-level work
to the aggregate phenomena. However, by presenting both empirical evidence of
an analogous household-level phenomenon and a household-level microtheoretic ex-
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planation distinct from exogenous government intervention or sectoral adjustment,
we have provided perspective on the microfoundations for environmental Kuznets
curves more generally, including an additional perspective on the fact that many
empirical investigations have not turned up such EKC results. And analysis of
household behaviors provides relevant perspective on the EKC mechanisms either
alongside or underlying political-economic mechanisms. To demonstrate that such
household behavior may underlie government intervention, we explicitly modeled
how aggregate-level EKCs could arise from voting, given the type of household pref-
erences that we observe to be revealed in fuels choices.
A direction for research arises from the fact that in the fuel-type regressions,
we ignored the fact that the decisions for each type are made simultaneously and
the fuel types are substitutes (some individual fuels are close substitutes, the fact
which drove our use of aggregated fuel types). One could consider econometrically
the integration, facing a menu of substitutes, of the binary (extensive margin) use
decision with the continuous (intensive margin) decision about how much of a fuel
to use conditional on use. Another research issue is that our forecasts of fuel choice,
conditional on income growth, take as given the set of fuels used for cooking. More
generally, we take as fixed the mix of products involved in the cooking process, de-
spite the assumption (implicit in such forecasts) of economic development underlying
the income growth. We could in future research formally consider the possibility of




Here we discuss information in the PIHS and how we formed our fuel-quantity
estimates. Several questions permit calculations of quantities. Note that diﬀerent
questions were asked of males and females. In general, we believe that a number of
assumptions must be made in order to arrive at quantity estimates.
a. Traditional fuels quantities
For wood, females are asked how many kilograms of wood are used per day,
and how many days wood is used per month. We multiply these responses to
get kilograms of wood used per month. However, this follows somewhat arbitrary
correction of what appear to be miscodings of some observations, in grams instead
of kilograms. The processes for dung and charcoal were the same, and also faced
miscoding issues. The process for “biomass”(i.e. other biomass fuels) was also the
same, after an additional step in which all of the other-biomass fuels are aggregated.
b. Modern fuels quantities
Here, quantity estimates can be constructed in at least two ways based on ques-
tions asked of males. If we can use males’ answers about hours of usage to pro-
portionally indicate quantity (applying a constant flow per hour), we could just use
hours themselves.However, we are not sure whether to put much faith in those an-
swers. They tend to have missing values for more than half of the households in
which females report positive hours of usage and for a large fraction of households
in which males themselves report some useage. Thus it is hard to know what sub-
sample of answers is non-missing. Another diﬃculty in the natural-gas case is that
the quantity responses seem to be generated from utility bills which seem to arrive
infrequently, even quarterly, and to apply to a varying number of days for diﬀerent
households. The bills are also usually for multiple households.
Thus, our hours variables are meant to be estimates of hours of use of the fuel
in question for cooking and other related purposes, and are created using questions
asked of females. For each fuel (kerosene, LPG, and natural gas), females are asked
how many days per month they use each of a number of appliances which make
use the fuel in question, as well as how many hours a day they use the appliance
when they use it. These answers can be multiplied to estimate hours per month of
appliance useage (we add together only the appliances used for cooking and related
services; for example, for kerosene we count stove hours, but not room heater or
lamp hours). Where appropriate (in particular for stoves), females are also asked
how many burners the appliance has. We use that response to estimate the number
of burners used in an average use of that appliance, and then use that number
to estimate ”burner-hours” per month. If a constant flow per burner-hour can be
meaningfully applied, then this number diﬀers only in scale from the true quantity.
2. Income, consumption and other household characteristics
The PIHS has measures of household income and household expenditure, both
resultign from quite detailed calculations. We use expenditures to better reflect
long-run income (see Section 4), but have also made use of income, as a robustness
check. We do not generate our own measures of these variables. As mentioned
above, the PIHS also contains information that we can use on household size, num-
ber of adults, and number of children in the household, household head’s age and
education, number of rooms in the house, and whether the house has windows.
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Predicted indoor air pollution levels under alternative assumptions regarding the  
ratio of emissions from traditional fuels to emissions from modern fuels:  
non-linearity parameter = 1, non-linearity parameter = 0.5 
Per-capita household expenditure
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Predicted indoor air pollution levels under different assumptions  
about the degree and direction of non-linearity in the emissions function: 




Predicted indoor air pollution levels under different assumptions  
about the degree and direction of non-linearity in the emissions function: 








































































Means Full Rural Urban Poor Rich
Household income 4608 3295 5971 1434 7777
Per-capita income 728 447 1019 177 1139
Household expenditure 4957 4122 5821 3935 5978
Per-capita expenditure 770 582 964 486 876
Food expenditure 1967 2064 1865 1886 2048
Fuel expenditure 203 124 284 160 245
Household size 7.5 7.6 7.3 8.1 6.8
No. of adults 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.8
No. of kids 3.8 4.0 3.7 4.6 3.1
Education of head 6.2 6.3 6.2 6.2 6.3
Age of head 45.9 45.7 46.1 45.5 46.3
No. of rooms 2.5 2.3 2.6 2.3 2.7
Proportion of households that use:
electricity (for cooking) 0.76(0.02) 0.58(0.01) 0.95(0.02) 0.67(0.01) 0.85(0.03)
gas (for cooking) 0.18(0.18) 0.01(0.01) 0.36(0.36) 0.07(0.07) 0.28(0.28)
LPG (for cooking) 0.08(0.08) 0.04(0.04) 0.12(0.11) 0.05(0.05) 0.11(0.10)
kerosene (for cooking) 0.73(0.17) 0.90(0.08) 0.56(0.26) 0.83(0.13) 0.64(0.21)
wood (for cooking) 0.70(0.64) 0.91(0.83) 0.49(0.45) 0.82(0.75) 0.59(0.54)
dung (for cooking) 0.45(0.41) 0.67(0.62) 0.22(0.19) 0.58(0.54) 0.32(0.28)
charcoal (for cooking) 0.08(0.01) 0.09(0.01) 0.01(0.01) 0.09(0.01) 0.07(0.01)
coal (for cooking) 0.01(0.00) 0.01(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.01(0.00) 0.01(0.00)
biomass (for cooking) 0.23(0.22) 0.36(0.34) 0.10(0.09) 0.30(0.29) 0.16(0.15)
Proportion of households that:
collect wood 0.32 0.57 0.06 0.43 0.21
collect dung 0.21 0.35 0.06 0.29 0.13
report smoke irritation 0.69 0.93 0.46 0.82 0.56
have no windows 0.48 0.61 0.35 0.60 0.36
have a chimney 0.16 0.22 0.10 0.20 0.14
have a servant 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
No. of households 4650 2366 2284 2323 2332
Notes: expenditure and income are per month; households in the ‘poor’ (‘rich’)
subsample are those with per-capita expenditures below (above) the median for the
full sample.
Table 2
Fuel use by expenditure percentiles: disaggregated
Poorest Middle Richest
quartile quartiles quartile
Fuel use for cooking: proportion of households
natural gas 0.06 0.14 0.37
LPG 0.05 0.07 0.13
kerosene 0.08 0.16 0.19
wood 0.81 0.72 0.45
dung 0.60 0.45 0.22
Other biomass 0.32 0.24 0.12
Fuel use for cooking: averages per capita per month
natural gas (hours) 0.97 2.82 11.77
LPG (hours) 0.68 0.93 2.38
Kerosene (hours) 1.66 4.05 6.68
Wood (kgs.) 30.04 28.76 32.53
Dung (kgs.) 18.61 20.66 23.24
Other biomass (kgs.) 18.88 23.85 25.91
Notes: averages reported are unconditional means, i.e., include households with
zero consumption.
Table 3
Multiple fuel use by expenditure percentiles: aggregated
Expenditure quartile
Poorest Middle Richest
Proportion of households that use: quartile quartiles quartile
one fuel 0.32 0.41 0.64
two fuels 0.46 0.41 0.26
three fuels 0.21 0.16 0.09
four fuels 0.01 0.01 0.01
five fuels 0.00 0.00 0.00
only natural gas or LPG 0.07 0.15 0.41
only natural gas or LPG, and kerosene 0.01 0.01 0.03
only kerosene 0.02 0.05 0.08
only traditional fuels and kerosene 0.05 0.09 0.07
only traditional fuels 0.82 0.65 0.35
both modern fuels and traditional fuels 0.03 0.04 0.05
Table 4 
Distinguishing the fuel-choice and fuel-use decisions 
 
BTUs From “Traditional” Fuels (dung, biomass, fuelwood) * 








Specification linear linear linear quartic quartic Quartic 
       
Expenditure/pc -.057 (1.94) -.001 (11.8) .450 (6.83) 1.07 (1.80) -.004 (1.90) 2.64 (1.89) 
(Expendit./pc)2 --- --- --- -.002 (1.48) 4E-6 (0.9) -.003 (1.20) 
(Expendit./pc)3 --- --- --- 1E-6 (1.3) -2E-9 (0.6) 2E-6 (1.1) 
(Expendit./pc)4 --- --- --- -3E-10 (1.3) 3E-13 (0.4) -6E-10 (1.1) 
HouseholdSize -43.3 (15.9) -.013 (1.51) -137 (16.6) -41.9 (15.3) -.018 (2.00) -120 (14.7) 
Constant 1243 (17.9) 3.05 (9.15) 1348 (9.63) 1015 (8.74) 3.80 (7.61) 804 (3.03) 
MonthEffects b p = .0000 p = .0000 p = .0000 p = .0000 p = .0000 p = .0000 
AreasEffects b p = .0000 p = .0000 p = .0000 p = .0000 p = .0000 p = .0000 
Fit/Comparison R2OLS=34% R2OLS=47% R2OLS=25% R2OLS=34% R2OLS=47% R2OLS=26% 
# observations 3876 3876 2888 3876 3876 2888 
 
 
BTUs From “Modern” Fuels (kerosene, LPG, natural gas) * 







Specification linear linear linear quartic quartic Quartic 
       
Expenditure/pc 3.02 (14.5) .001 (15.2) 5.38 (6.33) 20.0 (3.75) .004 (2.24) 13.7 (2.12) 
(Expendit./pc)2 --- --- --- -.023 (2.38) -2E-6 (0.5) -.024 (2.10) 
(Expendit./pc)3 --- --- --- 1E-5 (1.8) -6E-10 (0.2) 2E-4 (2.1) 
(Expendit./pc)4 --- --- --- -2E-9 (1.4) 4E-13 (0.6) -4E-9 (2.0) 
HouseholdSize 58.5 (2.81) .046 (6.72) -75.5 (0.75) 70.9 (3.37) .052 (7.56) -82.9 (3.47) 
Constant -7009 (10) -2.53 (12.8) -17250 (4) -10751 (9) -3.39 (9.46) -1273 (0.9) 
MonthEffects b p = .0000 p = .0000 p = .0000 p = .0000 p = .0000 p = .0000 
AreasEffects b p = .0000 p = .0000 p = .0000 p = .0000 p = .0000 p = .0000 
Fit R2OLS=29% R2OLS=47% R2OLS=26% R2OLS=30% R2OLS=47% R2OLS=26% 
Observations 4331 4331 1562 4331 4331 1562 
 
*: in parentheses next to the coefficients are t statistics, or ratios of the coefficients to the coefficients’ standard errors 
a: likelihood-ratio tests comparing these Cragg runs to the single Tobit regression clearly reject the Tobit (p = .0000) 
b: we report p values for joint tests of significance for 11 month dummies and the area (spatial-fixed-effect) dummies  
c: for linear, not all convergence criteria satisfied; for quartic, report OLS coefficients and tests (MLE did not converge); 
   in all our robustness checks for modern fuels, βExpPC is positive and significant for both the use and quantity decisions  
Table 5 
Household composition and fuel-choice: 








































Month effects (p-value from chi-square test of joint significance) 
Area effects (p-value from chi-square test of joint significance) 
















































Month effects (p-value from chi-square test of joint significance) 
Area effects (p-value from chi-square test of joint significance) 









Note: absolute value of t-statistics reported in parentheses.  
